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17 September 1963

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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17 September 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 September 1963

DAILY BRIEF

Cuba-USSR: The USSR is showing concern over the re-emergence of frictions and disagreements in Soviet-Cuban relations.

Moscow apparently wants to reassure Castro that improvement in US-Soviet relations will not weaken Moscow's support of Cuba against US pressures. An authoritative Pravda "Observer" article of 12 September and several Moscow broadcasts denounced alleged US complicity in recent air and sea raids by Cuban exiles. These commentaries were accompanied by reaffirmations of the USSR's vague pledges to support Cuba against external attack.

It seems likely that one of the main points of current Soviet-Cuban friction stems from Cuban uncertainty as to what sort of backing the USSR would provide in response to the rising level of such antiregime activities. Another issue is the test ban treaty: Castro's present foot-dragging probably reflects fear of further US-Soviet accommodation at Cuban expense.

25X1 Castro remains unhappy over what he regards as highhanded Soviet sacrifice of 25X1 Cuban interests during last fall's missile crisis. Castro's ideological sym-25X1 pathies are much closer to the Chinese Communist than the Soviet position, but that he realized he could not continue to exist without Soviet aid. 25X1. 1

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Norway: Prime Minister Lyng's shaky Conservative-led minority coalition, which took office less than three weeks ago, will shortly be put to the test.

Parliamentary debate on the government's program begins tomorrow. The leadership of the opposition Labor Party is reported to be planning the introduction of a no-confidence resolution and is counting on the support of two extreme leftist deputies to provide the necessary majority to topple the government.

There is speculation that Labor may wish to delay the showdown vote until after next week's local elections, the results of which the party hopes will be taken as a mandate for its return to power.

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GRAIN HARVESTS IN USSR (million metric tons)

	Soviet claim for production	US. estimate of production	Soviet claim for procurement*
1958	141.2	125	56.6
1959	125.9	100	46.6
1960	134.4	100	46.7
1961	138.0	115	52.1
1962	147.5	115	56.6

*U.S. Intelligence accepts Soviet procurement claims as valid.

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NOTES

USSR: The Soviet Union may be preparing to admit publicly to one of its poorest harvests in recent years. On 12 September a TASS commentator said that the state procurement of grain--about one third of total production and a fair indicator of production trends--would be about equal to that for 1959 and 1960. This would mean nearly an 18-percent decrease over last year in procurements although a 21-percent increase had been planned.

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Congo: UN officials in Elisabethville believe that fighting between former Katangan gendarmes and Congo army troops is likely once UN forces leave. The UN's efforts to solve the gendarmerie problem apparently will be limited to dropping leaflets offering a guarantee of safety if the gendarmes come out of the bush and give up their arms. Tshombé is alleged to be supplying funds to the gendarmes.

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*Iraq: The Baathist-dominated regime in Baghdad appears to be nearing a break with non-Baathist elements in the government. The non-Baathist military governor and the army chief of staff are reported to have submitted their resignations to the ruling junta. For some time non-Baathist officials have protested that they have been allowed little authority and have objected to the regime's growing rift with Nasir.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Under Secretary of the Treasury

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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